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In modern markets the need for the timely disclosure of detailed, accurate financial 
information is born of the radical separation of management and control apparent in the 
majority of large modern organisations. Inadequate disclosure of material information 
concerning the future and fortunes of listed companies can detract from the integrity of the 
market and its ability to provide a fair and efficient mechanism for participation in 
securities markets, while also impacting upon the perceived credibility of financial markets 
and the corporations constituting them. Reduced confidence in financial markets can in 
turn have longer-term flow on effects which can be felt throughout the economy. It follows 
that the effective operation of Australia's continuous disclosure regime is of great 
consequence in the Australian economic, political and social landscape. This paper details 
the history of the regime, the reasons for its introduction, and features of its recent 
enforcement by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). It uses this 
history to assess whether the most recently created and most often employed enforcement 
tool, the infringement notice mechanism, is achieving the goals set for it at its inception. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A crucial element of financial market regulation in Australia geared towards achieving and 
maintaining market integrity is the obligation of listed and other disclosing entities to 
continuously disclose material information to the market. The continuous disclosure 
obligation is found in Listing Rule 3.1 of the Australian Securities Exchange listing rules 
which currently states: 
 
Once an entity is or becomes aware of any information concerning it that a 
reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on the price or 
value of the entity’s securities, the entity must immediately tell the ASX that 
information.1 
 
If, as posited by Golding and Kalfus, ‘the vigour of enforcement is the key to the 
effectiveness of continuous disclosure requirements’2 then it is important to determine 
whether regulatory enforcement activity is keeping the market in check. This paper details 
the history of the regime, the reasons for its introduction, and features of its recent 
enforcement by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), focussing 
on the efficacy of the most recently created and most often employed enforcement tool, the 
infringement notice mechanism. 
 
 
2. The Theoretical Foundations of Continuous Disclosure 
 
Market integrity can be defined in different ways. A positivist approach might characterise 
it simply as ‘the extent to which trading participants do not engage in prohibited trading 
behaviours’.3 A more general normative ideal is that market integrity refers to ‘the ability of 
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investors to transact in a fair and informed market’.4 This implies transparency and equal 
access to information and conjures the spectre of the efficient markets hypothesis. 
Founded on this (somewhat discredited) ground is the ideal of continuous 
disclosure, which is seen as an essential structural component in the informational matrix of 
corporate disclosure. In the absence of continuous disclosure, there would only exist 
mandatory periodic disclosure, where companies disclose material information to markets 
at set intervals. This has come to be considered somewhat unacceptable in a climate where 
business conditions and fortunes change with unprecedented speed, causing volatility in the 
prices of listed securities. The risk of sharp dips in investor confidence in the markets in 
which they participate (including importantly, international investors) and the resulting 
choice to take their money out of play entirely can leave the game itself bereft of the 
essential oil turning the cogs of advanced industrial economies – liquid capital. This is seen 
as anathema to continued steady economic growth and our ‘economic well-being’.5 Such 
price fluctuations are therefore seen as undesirable in the management of the economic 
cycle and consumer confidence. The potential for shadier practices such as insider trading 
and market manipulation also become more feasible and indeed potentially more bountiful 
when crucial material information, as yet unknown to the market, might be used by 
company insiders for their own benefit.  
 Other desired effects of an effective continuous disclosure regime include a lower 
cost of capital, increased liquidity and the societal buy-in to capitalist modes of economic 
management (think superannuation)6, all born of increased or at least steady investor 
confidence in financial markets and their potential to deliver consistent economic growth 
and desired living standards. An effective continuous disclosure regime also assists market 
efficiency in the sense that it aids price and value discovery by investors and effects the 
allocation of resources to companies most ‘deserving’ on financial criteria and the 
withdrawal of funds from poorly performing investments, ensuring the ‘best’ use of 
available funds and thus fostering allocative efficiency. 
 It follows then that the effective operation of the continuous disclosure regime is of 
great consequence in the Australian economic, political and social landscape. In its absence, 
the consumption and enjoyment of financial securities might become nasty, brutish and 
short. 
 
 
3. The Historical Foundations of Continuous Disclosure 
 
In October 1989, at the request of the then Attorney-General Lionel Bowen, the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee of Legal and Constitutional Affairs began an inquiry 
into corporate practices and the rights of shareholders. At this time, after the market crash 
of 1987 and the collapse of several ‘prominent’ Australian businesses (Rothwells Limited, 
the Hooker Corporation, Qintex Australia Limited) Australian corporate regulation was 
coming under increasing scrutiny. The abuse of reporting requirements then in existence 
and the employment of off balance sheet reporting to conceal risky or unfavourable 
transactions misled individual investors and the wider market, one of the consequences 
being ‘a significant loss of investor confidence, both amongst Australian and overseas 
investors, in the reliability of corporate financial information in Australia’.7 
 While the inquiry continued, in June 1991 a new Attorney-General Michael Duffy 
requested an examination by the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee (a prior 
incarnation of CAMAC, the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee) of the 
potential need for a strengthening of the disclosure requirements of listed corporations. 
While continuous disclosure existed as part of the ASX listing rules at the time, they were 
not backed by statute. As explained in an ASX reflection on the regime released 2002, ‘a 
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spate of Australian corporate collapses in the 1980s resulted in significant withdrawal of 
capital (especially foreign capital) from the Australian market. This experience highlighted 
the importance of integrity to the Australian capital markets’.8 This is reflected in a news 
release from the Attorney-General’s office which stated ‘there is a great deal of concern 
amongst investors that they may not be as well informed as they ought to be regarding the 
ongoing state of companies in which they have invested’.9 
 At the time there did not exist in the corporations act ‘a comprehensive scheme for 
the full and accurate disclosure of material matters on a timely basis … there is no general 
continuous disclosure requirement for the benefit of those engaged in the secondary trading 
of securities’,10 except in relation to particular circumstances such as the issuing of a 
prospectus, entry into takeover actions, and entry into schemes of arrangement.  
 In a report released September 1991 CASAC recommended that statutory support 
be given to an enhanced disclosure system where organisations deemed ‘disclosing entities’ 
would be required to lodge half yearly reports (in addition to their existing obligation to 
provide annual reports), as well as disclose any material information affecting the 
organisations’ securities to the Australian Securities Commission (ASC) within 24 hours. 
CASAC preferred this latter requirement over another option on the table at the time to 
require companies to report to the market quarterly. To ensure the new requirements had 
enough force behind them CASAC advocated statutory backing of the continuous 
disclosure regime as it was argued that a disclosure system relying upon the ASX listing 
rules alone (as had been the case previously), mainly it would seem for the reasons that 
there would remain uncertainty as to the enforceability of the rules, and that the 
requirements as they existed in ASX form alone imposed no criminal or civil liability in the 
case of a breach, whereas statutory force would ‘ensure a more comprehensive, accurate 
and easily accessible reporting and information retrieval system [which should also be] 
supported by appropriate criminal liabilities and civil remedies’.11 Accordingly CASAC 
recommended that the Australian Securities Commission should be given powers to enforce 
compliance with the statutory continuous disclosure obligations and obtain remedies for 
those affected by contravention.12 
 Some of the benefits cited by CASAC at the time relating to the integrity of 
Australian capital markets concerned the supposed ability of such a regime to  
 
• overcome the inability of general market forces to guarantee adequate and 
timely disclosure by disclosing entities; 
• encourage greater securities research by investors and advisors, thereby 
ensuring that securities prices more closely, and quickly, reflect underlying 
economic values; 
• ensure that equity and loan resources in the Australian market are more 
effectively channelled into appropriate investments, and that funds are 
withheld or withdrawn from poorly performing disclosing entities. This 
will promote capital market efficiency; 
• assist debtholders in monitoring the performance of disclosing entities and 
thereby determine whether, or when, to exercise any right to withdraw or 
reinvest their loan funds, or convert debt to equity; 
• act as a further, or substitute, warning device for holders of charges over 
corporate assets, that breaches in covenants may have taken place, or the 
risk of default has increased; 
• assist potential equity or debt holders of disclosing entities to better 
evaluate their investment alternatives; 
• lessen the possible distorting effects of rumour on securities prices; 
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• minimize the opportunities for perpetrating insider trading or similar 
market abuses; 
• improve managerial performance and accountability by providing the 
market with more timely indicators of corporate performance; 
• encourage the growth of information systems within disclosing entities, 
thereby assisting directors in their decision making and compliance with 
their fiduciary duties; and reduce the time and costs involved in preparing 
takeover and prospectuses documents.13 
 
In November 1991, just two months later, the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee of Legal and Constitutional Affairs released its final report entitled ‘Corporate 
practices and the rights of shareholders’, recommending a regime of continuous disclosure 
be implemented and enforced through the ASX listing rules, rather than through new 
legislation in the corporations law as advocated by CASAC on the basis that if the ASX 
listing rules in force at the time were amended with their enforceability in mind14 that 
changes to the corporations law would be unnecessary. The Committee was concerned not 
to create fetters on businesses struggling their way out of the recession of the early 1990s. 
They expressed the view that the listing rules were preferable to ‘black letter law’ in such 
areas largely due to their flexibility.15  
 In its response to the Lavarch report tabled December 1992, the Federal government 
stated it was ‘not satisfied that an ASX administered disclosure scheme is sufficient and is 
therefore committed to a legislative scheme’.16 The government had recently introduced 
into Parliament the Corporate Law Reform Bill (No.2) 1992 which contained an enhanced 
corporate disclosure scheme encompassing periodic and continuous disclosure.17 The 
government was of the view that legislative support would lend the regime greater weight 
than the listing rules would alone:  
 
It is considered appropriate that enforceable obligations with civil and 
criminal consequences should be contained in legislation rather than in stock 
exchange rules which form part of a private contract between the exchange 
and listed entities. In addition, a legislative scheme has the advantage of 
enabling investors to claim damages against a company which does not 
comply with the disclosure obligations.18 
 
Despite this commitment to a statutory backed regime, following ‘extensive public 
debate’19 the government decided not to legislate directly for continuous disclosure, but 
rather, to reinforce the listing rules of the ASX already in existence, though legislation was 
created for unlisted disclosing entities which are obviously not caught by the ASX listing 
rules (s675). Speaking with the benefit of hindsight in 2002, the ASX stated ‘Australia’s 
experience is that, without the legislative support for continuous disclosure and a regulator 
with an appetite to enforce it, the regime may be perceived as being ineffectual in 
encouraging compliance’.20 
 
 
4. Enforcement Options and the Granting of the Power to Fine 
 
The effect of this blending of market operator and legislative control has had the effect that 
the great responsibility for administering the continuous disclosure regime is at the feet of 
the (currently) sole market operator, the ASX, and Australia’s corporate cop the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission.21 While the ASXs role as a market operator listed 
on its own exchange is relatively technical and is restricted to setting the rules, monitoring 
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trading activity and potential continuous disclosure breaches before informing ASIC, there 
are several layers to the enforcement options available to ASIC which it is worth exploring 
in understanding the hitherto more frequently used infringement notice. 
 To do this however, a basic understanding of the continuous disclosure regime is 
necessary. As noted above, the rule in its current form states that an entity must inform the 
ASX once it becomes aware of information which a reasonable person would expect to 
have a material effect on the price or value of the entity’s securities. Exceptions to the rule 
are set out in 3.1A.22 The reinforcement provided by s674(2) states that if the entity has 
information which listing rules of the market operator require the entity to inform it of and 
the information is not generally available, and if a reasonable person would expect the 
information to have a material effect on the price or value of the entity’s securities if it were 
generally available, that the entity must notify the market operator, effectively swallowing 
up listing rule 3.1.23 
 Several aspects of the rules require unpacking. Firstly, s677 states that a ‘reasonable 
person’ would be taken to expect information to have a ‘material effect’ on the price or 
value of an entity’s securities if the information would, or would be likely to, influence 
persons who commonly invest in securities in deciding whether to acquire or dispose of the 
Enhanced Disclosure securities.24 By way of further clarification, Guidance Note 8, 
released by the ASX, indicates that ‘a reasonable person would not expect information to be 
disclosed if the result would be unreasonably prejudicial to the company or disclosure 
would result in an inordinate amount of detail’.25 
 According to the definitions in the listing rules at 19.12 an entity becomes ‘aware’ 
of information if a director or executive officer ‘has, or ought reasonably to have, come into 
possession of the information in the course of the performance of their duties as a director 
or executive of that entity’. 
 As for the statutory supplementation of the listing rule, information is considered 
‘generally available’ in s676 if it consists of ‘readily observable matter’ or if ‘it has been 
made known in a manner that would, or would be likely to, bring it to the attention of 
persons who commonly invest in securities of a kind whose price or value might be 
affected by the information’. The management of these requirements by disclosing entities 
can prove tricky in practice. 
 In 1996 CASAC was asked to examine the effectiveness of the operation of the 
continuous disclosure regime. While concluding the regime was operating effectively, it 
suggested several avenues for procedural and technical reform of the provisions and their 
enforcement.26 Of interest to the development of enforcement actions in policing the regime 
were recommendations 11 and 12, which sought to clarify the conceptual content of 
intention, recklessness and negligent breach of the provisions in relation to civil and 
criminal liability, and in response to the ASCs submission for a wider range of enforcement 
options to ‘encourage compliance’ in addition to criminal and civil actions, CASAC 
recommended that the ASC be able to enter enforceable undertakings with companies and 
impose small administrative fines for minor contraventions of the regime.  
 The earliest action undertaken by ASIC in its enforcement of the continuous 
disclosure regime occurred in 1998 where ASIC pursued Crown Limited for its failure to 
inform the market of poor performance in late 1997. As noted by Golding and Kalfus, the 
situation ‘marked the end of the time where disclosing entities could take the attitude that 
the interests of shareholders are best protected by trying to deal privately with likely 
negative information until a solution resolves itself’.27 Reasons for the movement away 
from the use of enforceable undertakings may have stemmed from the difficulties ASIC 
encountered in enforcing the regime in 2001, where ASIC launched a number of inquiries 
into suspected contraventions of the regime by Brambles Industries Limited, AMP Limited, 
WMC Limited but failed to come up with any enforcement results. 
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While failure to comply with Listing rule 3.1 is a criminal offence under s674(2) for 
the disclosing entity (s1311) (the punishment being in the order of 200 penalty units, 
imprisonment for 5 years, or both), the section was also made a financial services civil 
penalty provision in 2002 when the Corporations Act was modified by the enactment of the 
Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth) (commencing 11 March 2002) which extended 
the civil penalty regime to cover market misconduct provisions, including continuous 
disclosure (s1317E).28 
Amendments in 2004 as part of the CLERP 9 Act increased the maximum penalty 
for corporations from $200,000 to $1 million,29 and extended civil liability to persons 
involved in an organisation’s contravention (s674(2A) and 675(2A)), meaning that civil 
penalties could be sought against directors and executive officers involved in a 
contravention of the continuous disclosure rules (s1317E(1) and 1317DA).30 The reasoning 
behind this change was that it may act as a more forceful and hopefully effective deterrent 
than financial penalties imposed solely on the entity. 
Up until the enactment of the CLERP 9 Act, no criminal prosecutions relating to 
continuous disclosure breaches had been launched (the first was not launched until June 
2006 in relation to Harts Australasia Limited) and only three civil penalty applications had 
been launched between the extension of civil penalty regime to market misconduct 
provisions including continuous disclosure breaches in 2002 and introduction of the 
CLERP 9 Act on 1 July 2004. 
The difficulties encountered by ASIC in its policing of the continuous disclosure 
regime and subsequent requests from ASIC for less unwieldy firepower to be added to its 
enforcement armoury, which could be directed at quickly responding to less serious 
continuous disclosure contraventions marked the naissance of the infringement notice. The 
tool was supposed to supplement existing criminal and civil enforcement measures and 
function as an ‘on the spot fine’ for continuous disclosure breaches. Through s1317DAC 
ASIC has the power to issue an infringement notice if it has reasonable grounds to believe 
that a disclosing entity has contravened s674(2) or 675(2).  
The infringement notice was introduced to remedy 
 
a significant gap in the current enforcement framework by facilitating the 
imposition of a relatively small financial penalty and requiring information 
disclosure in relation to relatively minor contraventions of the continuous 
disclosure provisions of the Corporations Act that would not otherwise be 
pursued through the courts. The capacity to issue an infringement notice also 
allows ASIC to signal its views concerning appropriate disclosure practices 
to listed entities more effectively than through court action alone.31 
 
The infringement notice mechanism has been said to represent a policy reversal32 from an 
initial position which saw the primary responsibility for enforcing contraventions of the 
regime as lying squarely on the ASXs shoulders with the support of the legislative backing 
of the rule, the threat of criminal penalties flowing from which were expected to have 
preventative force. With the passing of time and legislative review however ASIC has come 
to play an ever more significant role in the policing of the continuous disclosure regime. 
The reasons underlying this policy reversal stem from the difficulties in enforcement faced 
by the ASX and ASIC33 whose earlier penalties had an ‘all or nothing’ character about them 
(suspension, delisting, criminal sanctions, civil penalties), resulting in a reluctance in their 
employ, and a resulting lack of faith in the continuous disclosure regime in the face of 
questionable company disclosure practices. Indeed, the ASX stated two years prior to its 
introduction that ‘[t]he tools of prosecution under the Corporations Act do not necessarily 
deliver the swiftness of regulatory response needed to encourage a change in behaviour and 
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elevate market awareness about appropriate behaviour. A power … to impose an 
appropriate financial penalty is currently being examined and is strongly supported by 
ASX’.34 
 In addition to its less cumbersome employment, according to the then Deputy 
Chairman of ASIC Jeremy Cooper,  
 
the purpose of the [infringement notice] regime is substantially ‘educative’ 
because compliance is effectively voluntary. I have described the issue of a 
notice as a ‘chess’ move which sets in train a series of strategic decisions on 
the part of both ASIC and the company involved. I say this because ASIC 
cannot enforce the notice itself (ie sue to recover the amount of the penalty 
or take any action in relation to a failure on the part of the company to 
respond to the notice per se).35 
 
In its Regulatory Guide 73, ASIC explained that infringement notices were ‘designed to 
provide a fast and effective remedy so that redress is proportionate and proximate in time to 
the alleged breach. The matter will be dealt with in a timely and efficient way, while still 
providing significant protection to the disclosing entity’.36 
 The regulatory guide also set out ten steps in the infringement notice process, which 
begins with an ASIC investigation, and if an infringement notice is deemed appropriate, 
moves to the briefing of an ASIC delegate who will examine the matter with a fresh set of 
eyes (not having been involved in initial investigation). If the delegate believes a breach has 
occurred, a hearing notice is issued to the entity where evidence may be presented, and a 
hearing is held to determine whether to issue an infringement notice. If reasonable grounds 
exist for believing a breach has occurred, an infringement notice will be issued served with 
the entity being given 28 days to comply.  
 If the notice is complied with, ASIC is not able to begin civil or criminal 
proceedings against the entity. If it does not comply within this time frame, the entity may 
seek an extension or seek to have the notice withdrawn (s1317DAI(1)), or choose not to 
comply with the notice at all. If it chooses the latter, ASIC faces a tough decision as to 
whether to commence civil proceedings against the entity under Pt 9.4B and/or s1324B of 
the Corporations Act, with the maximum civil penalty being $1million. ASIC can choose to 
withdraw the notice, and if it does so, it is not restricted in the action it may take against the 
entity. 
 
 
5. The Employment of the Infringement Notice Mechanism 
Since 2004 
 
Has the infringement notice mechanism lived up to the expectations set for it at its 
inception? The only public information available as far as infringement notices are 
concerned involves only the entities which have complied with one. ASIC publishes details 
of infringement notices which have been complied with when finalised, presumably 
keeping with the educative goals of the mechanism. Most companies studied (though not 
all) also make their own announcement in relation to the payment of the fine. Unfortunately 
information regarding infringement notices issued but not complied with is, strictly 
speaking, unavailable. While s 1317DAJ(1) of the Corporations Act prohibits ASIC from 
publicising details of companies who fail to comply with an infringement notice, this has 
not stopped ASIC revealing its suspicion of Telstra on one occasion, though despite issuing 
an infringement notice which was not complied with, ASIC chose not to pursue the 
AAHANZBS Conference 2010 
8 
company.37 Nevertheless, there is no real way of knowing whether a company has been 
issued an infringement notice if it has chosen not to comply with it. 
The table below tracks compliance with infringement notices issued since the 
introduction of the measure to July 2010. 
 
Infringement Notices Complied with 2004-10 
Company Name Fine Amount Date Finalised GICS Industry Group 
SBP Solbec $33,000 1 August 2005 Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 
QRS QRSciences $33,000 17 February 2006 Technology Hardware & Equipment 
SDI SDI $33,000 21 April 2006 Health Care Equipment & Services 
AVS Avastra $33,000 15 May 2006 Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 
ATR Astron $66,000 18 July 2006 Materials 
ACU Avantogen $33,000 8 December 2006 Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 
PMN Promina $100,000 20 March 2007 Insurance 
RCA Raw Capital Partners $33,000 1 August 2007 Software & Services 
SBS Sub-Sahara Resources NL $33,000 29 April 2008 Materials 
RIO Rio Tinto $100,000 5 June 2008 Materials 
CBA Commonwealth Bank $100,000 14 October 2009 Financials 
 
Collecting each instance of infringement notice issuance together it is possible to conduct 
simple empirical analyses to gain a more generalised picture of the operation of the 
mechanism in the Australian market. This allows the development of tentative (given there 
are only 11 companies in the sample) or provisional insights into the profile of companies 
involved in continuous disclosure breaches and ASIC’s response times to alleged breaches. 
 
Company Size 
As at July 2010 some $597,000 has been paid to ASIC in satisfaction of infringement 
notices. Of this figure, $231,000 has been paid by seven of the smaller companies in the 
enforcement penalty hierarchy with a market capitalisation below $100 million, while there 
has only been one $66,000 fine for a mid-tier company with a market cap above $100 
million. The remaining $300,000 has been paid by the three of Australia’s largest 
organisations with market capitalisations exceeding $1000 million. While in absolute terms 
the larger companies have forked out more in infringement notice penalties due to the 
higher quantum of penalty (a little over half the total amount received by ASIC), smaller 
companies seem somewhat disproportionately represented with seven of the eleven (63 per 
cent) companies fined being Tier 3 companies with market capitalisation under $100 
million. 
In 2007, Langley found that smaller companies had a greater propensity for non-
disclosure – 71 per cent of companies in the seven company sample available at the time 
had a market capitalisation below $100 million when fined. The reason posited for this was 
that ‘effective implementation of continuous disclosure programs [at smaller companies] 
would seem to be less successful than in large publicly listed companies’.38 
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Despite ASIC having built a reputation early on for chasing the minnows rather than 
the big guns of the Australian market, a closer look shows this may not be the case. Of the 
1924 securities listed on the ASX, only 166 have a market capitalisation in excess of $1000 
million, 368 fall between $100 and $1000 million, while the overwhelming majority, 1390 
or 72 per cent, of companies have a market cap below $100 million. While the infringement 
notice data set is extremely small at present, at this stage ASICs fining of smaller 
companies seems consistent with market capitalisation. Indeed, due to recent infringement 
activity, it seems the opposite might be said – that ASIC is chasing the big guns since 27 
per cent of fines have been issued to companies with market capitalisations over $100 
million despite the fact they only represent 8 per cent of the market. Again, the available 
data set is not really conducive to any reliable generalisability on this question, but it is 
interesting nonetheless given previous conjectures concerning ASICs fining tendencies. In 
relation to Langley’s hypothesis that smaller companies might not have established the 
systems around effective continuous disclosure compliance leading to their having poor 
disclosure performance and being fined, which practically speaking may be no less true, the 
breakdown of companies constituting the Australian market suggests this may simply be 
due to the fact there are just more smaller companies around to be inadequately dealing 
with their continuous disclosure obligations. 
 
Industry Group 
On the basis of ASICs identification of speculative sectors as ‘being most at risk of non-
disclosure’ Langley found supporting evidence in the fact that ‘[d]isclosure issues have 
generally arisen from entities operating in speculative industries, like mining, energy, 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology’.39 As at the middle of 2010, a total of three 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences companies, three Materials (read mining) 
companies, one Technology Hardware and Equipment company, one Software and Services 
company, one Health Care Equipment & Services company, one Insurer and one Financial 
company have been issued infringement notices. ASICs prediction concerning speculative 
‘sectors’ has explained six out of the eleven infringement notices issued to companies in the 
mining and biotechnology sectors. Despite this however, not all of those companies could 
readily be classed as ‘speculative’ securities as such. Further, the presence of institutions 
from sectors not usually regarded as being speculative including insurance and banking is 
cause for concern, especially in view of the fact they were also amongst the largest 
companies to have received an infringement notice, who presumably have the resources to 
deal with such issues. 
 
ASIC Response Times 
An important issue surrounds the proximity of ASICs enforcement action to the breach of 
the regime. As noted above, the infringement notice regime was designed to avail ASIC of 
a speedier tool through which to educate the market and effectively process and police 
contraventions as soon as possible in a bid to assuage any loss in confidence in the integrity 
of the market. While ASICs stated goal was to issue infringement notices within 3 months 
of the alleged breach40 (though it has a maximum period of 12 months in which to do so 
(1317DAC(5)), Langley found in 2007 that ‘the average time for ASIC to issue an 
infringement notice from the date of the alleged breach is between seven and eight months, 
but the time period appears to be improving’.41 
The evidence from the 11 infringement notices issued to date illustrates that this 
average has remained constant with the addition of the most recent infringement notices 
issued, with an average of 8 months from the date the company became aware and the date 
the infringement notice was issued (not including SDI and CBA). While there was a period 
of improvement when Promina was fined, since then ASICs response time has been 
AAHANZBS Conference 2010 
10 
running at around 8 months, though this does not include the fine issued to the 
Commonwealth Bank as there is no extant information as to the date the infringement 
notice was issued. To date, the longest amount of time taken to issue an infringement notice 
has been 11 months and 23 days in relation to Avastra, while the shortest has been 4 
months and 11 days (Promina). 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
According to the 2006 Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Share Ownership Survey 
some 7.3 million Australians or 46 per cent or the Australian population own shares either 
directly or indirectly through superannuation. It is of the utmost importance therefore to 
ensure the fair and efficient operation of Australian capital markets and the resulting 
allocation of scarce resources to their best uses. Inadequate disclosure of material 
information concerning the future and fortunes of listed companies can detract from the 
integrity of the market and its ability to provide a fair and efficient mechanism for 
participation in securities markets, while also impacting upon the perceived credibility of 
financial markets and the corporations constituting them. Reduced confidence in financial 
markets can in turn have longer-term flow on effects which can be felt throughout the 
economy. 
This analysis has demonstrated that the infringement notice regime is currently 
functioning as it ever was, not necessarily as it was intended to when the history of the 
measure is taken into account. ASIC response times (with the CBA and SDI examples for 
which there is no infringement notice date aside) are extremely slow and have never really 
come close to the three months expected when the mechanism was introduced. This 
effectively steals away much the force of this powerful administrative mechanism holds in 
protecting the integrity of Australian financial markets, driving the development of solid 
corporate governance practices, and encouraging accountability to organisational 
stakeholders.  
Nevertheless, ASIC has shaken off an early reputation for going after smaller 
companies by recently taking three large scalps, with two being amongst the top ten in 
terms of capitalisation in the Australian market, potentially providing important educative 
examples to the rest of the market. While analysis of the factual circumstances of each case 
is necessary make more detailed conclusions as to whether an infringement notice was 
warranted, or indeed if more serious enforcement action should have been pursued, ASICs 
fining activity does send out the message (however weakly) that information management 
is of serious importance and that companies must discharge their disclosure obligations 
with continuous disclosure obligations front of mind. 
It is important to note that when the infringement notice mechanism was being 
passed through Parliament the Government agreed to review it after two years of its 
operation. Since releasing a consultation paper in March 2007 and receiving six responses 
(most recommending the withdrawal of ASICs power to fine) to which Treasury does not 
seem to have directly responded, the infringement notice mechanism continues to exist. 
This is despite the fact that it is not meeting the needs for which it was developed. While 
ASIC contended in its submission that the mechanism was quite swift when compared with 
court proceedings relating to continuous disclosure matters, strictly speaking this is not a 
relevant standard to compare against when considering the reasons for the introduction of 
the measure, with the former Chairman of ASIC Jeffrey Lucy stating that ‘[s]o much of the 
benefit is a quick resolution so the fact that it takes upwards of two months really does 
detract from it’.42 Criticism has also been levelled at the educative function of the 
mechanism, with enforceable undertakings being argued to provide a more fruitful source 
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of tuition. As expressed by the Chartered Secretaries of Australia, ‘[t]he infringement 
notice regime attempts to impose, with the benefit of hindsight, a “black and white” penalty 
on continuous disclosure value judgments made by companies where the subject matter is 
rarely black and white’.43 Analysis of the facts surrounding the issuance of infringement 
notices bears this criticism out, and alerts to the need to comprehensively review the 
enforcement of the continuous disclosure provisions, especially in light of recent financial 
markets events.  
 
Cary Di Lernia, University of Sydney. <cary.dilernia@sydney.edu.au> 
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